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About this report
This report illustrates the 
current practice of board 
oversight of risk management, 
based on in-depth interviews 
with executive and non-
executive directors. It highlights 
good practices but also 
challenges that leaders face 
and considers way forward. 
Risk and the strategic  
role of leadership
Dr Simon Ashby University of Plymouth
Dr Cormac Bryce University of Nottingham
Dr Patrick Ring Glasgow Caledonian University
How often, as we glance through the news headlines, do we see another corporate failure and 
wonder – where was the board?  
Risk and risk management have always 
been at the heart of concerns about 
leadership. In this report, we explore the 
role of boards in the risk management of 
the organisations they lead.
Following the global financial crisis in 
2007-8 the focus on risk and risk 
management has intensified. Today there 
is an abundance of literature as well as 
legislative and regulatory requirements. 
Risk and risk management regularly 
features on the board agenda, 
irrespective of sector.  
Yet remarkably less is known of the reality 
of day to day practices among executives 
and board members. We know little 
about how boards are truly integrating 
risk discussions into strategic decision 
making, as well as the skills and 
experience they have in managing risks  
to deliver business goals, and where  
there may be gaps.
This report suggests there are different 
approaches to risk management in 
practice each with their own respective 
strengths and weaknesses. It also 
suggests that there is some way to go  
to integrating strategy and risk decisions 
effectively and many conversations on  
risk appear to focus on the downside 
rather than upside. Perhaps we should 
ask a different question– how can boards 
better exploit the opportunity implicit in 
risk and uncertainty to drive better 
business outcomes?
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Foreword
We hope that this report provides  
useful insights for both boards and  
executives to reflect on emerging good 
practice. Policy makers too may also 
benefit by reflecting on these findings  
in the light of recent developments.  
The next phase of our work on risk will  
go on to consider how organisations 
embed effective risk management  
across the business.
Maggie McGhee
Director of Professional Insights 
ACCA
Boards have always been involved in the management of risk. Without appropriate risk taking, 
organisations cannot exploit the full range of strategic opportunities that are available to them, 
nor can they hope to protect themselves from less positive outcomes. 
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Executive 
summary
Equally, the governance and internal 
control roles of boards are closely 
connected with risk management. 
Effective risk assessment, reporting  
and control help to enhance a board’s 
governance and internal control  
activities, reducing the probability that  
an organisation may deviate from its 
stated objectives and so fail to meet  
the needs of its stakeholders. 
What is less clear is how board-level  
risk management discussions and 
practices are changing and developing, 
especially in relation to the complex  
and dynamic world that characterises  
the early 21st century. Changing 
technology, such as the growth of cloud 
computing and social media, creates 
opportunities for returns as well as  
losses as do the major political and 
economic changes associated with  
events such as Brexit, the election of 
President Trump in America, or the  
global financial crisis of 2007–8. 
The purpose of this ACCA research 
project was to discover what boards are 
talking about and doing about risk 
management, and the challenges that 
they face in ensuring the effectiveness of 
these activities. In particular, this project 
explored how boards are integrating their 
discussions about strategy and risk, along 
with how their risk-management skills and 
experience are developing. The project 
also investigated the challenges that 
boards face in performing their risk-
management roles and how the roles of 
the executive and non-executive director 
are evolving: even on an Anglo-Saxon 
style unitary board it is possible that 
differences may emerge.
The intention is to shed light on, and 
learn from, current practice, and to share 
examples of good practice where 
possible. It is for organisations and their 
boards to decide which of these practices 
are relevant to them, as part of their 
efforts to ensure that board level risk-
management conversations and practices 
are as ‘future-proof’ as possible. 
The project is based on: 
•  30 interviews with practising executive 
and non-executive directors (NEDs) from 
a broad cross-section of organisations; 
•  two focus groups consisting of a 
number of risk-management 
professionals; and
•  ACCA’s Global Forums, with particular 
thanks to the Global Forum on 
Governance, Risk and Performance. 
The research shows that board-level 
conversations and practices are varied 
and that this variation does not 
necessarily reflect the nature, scale and 
complexity of an organisation’s activities. 
It shows, however, a wide range of good 
practice across both larger and smaller 
organisations in a range of for-profit and 
not-for-profit sectors. 
6Key findings include the following.
•  Board-level conversations and 
practices in relation to strategy and 
risk management take place along a 
spectrum, with those of many boards 
being nearer to one end of the 
spectrum or the other (although a few 
display features from across the 
spectrum). The extremes of the 
spectrum can be characterised as: 
 o  the Principled approach, where 
discussions about risk are more 
likely to focus on the exploitation of 
upside opportunities, and connect 
strategy and risk in an implicit and 
unstructured way, potentially 
leading to inconsistent risk-
management decisions, and
 o  the Prescriptive approach, where 
risk-management activities are much 
more formalised and consistent,  
but with a high degree of focus on 
internal control which may mean that 
strategic opportunities are missed.
•  Boards are still finding it hard to 
understand and address softer factors, 
such as culture and risk appetite. 
Often, this is because of a lack of clear 
information and difficulties in connecting 
them to organisational performance.
•  Regulation and compliance remain key 
drivers for board-level involvement in 
risk management. Nonetheless, some 
organisations are increasingly aware of 
the strategic benefits of risk 
management in helping them to 
exploit opportunities and so exceed 
their stated objectives.
•  A high level of diversity in boards’ risk 
skills, knowledge, experience, 
education and training helps to develop 
a collective consciousness that allows 
a board to identify changes in risk 
exposures and respond appropriately. 
•  Factors such as lengthy risk reports 
and insufficient time devoted to risk 
management at board meetings create 
significant challenges for board-level 
risk-management activities.
•  NEDs walk a delicate line between 
participation (ensuring that tasks are 
performed) and oversight (providing 
assurance that tasks have been 
performed within the agreed 
parameters). NEDs need to understand 
the organisations that they are a part 
of and participate in strategic decision 
making, but their ability to step back 
from day-to-day pressures and their 
experience in other organisations 
allows them to perform a ‘critical 
friend’ role, helping to restrain over-
confident executives or encourage 
overly cautious ones. A unitary board 
should not mean that all board 
members need a single perspective.
The report also makes a series of 
recommendations for organisations, their 
boards and for policymakers. In particular, 
the report reflects interview participants 
(hereafter ‘participants’)’ concern that risk 
and risk management are not always 
viewed in a positive way. Risk may bring 
with it the potential for losses, but it also 
offers the potential for opportunity.  
Today’s board has a key role to play here, 
helping its organisation identify and exploit 
opportunities, which is as much a part of 
maximising the long term sustainable 
performance of the organisation as well 
as overseeing the mitigation of threats. 
Disclaimer
Though funded by ACCA, this research 
project was conducted by independent 
university academics. The findings from 
this project reflect the views of the 
participants and are not necessarily 
those of ACCA or its staff and members.
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Risk may bring with 
it the potential for 
losses, but it also 
offers the potential 
for opportunity. 
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81.1 UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGE: 
HOW ARE BOARDS RESPONDING TO 
RISK-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES?
Organisations in the 21st century are 
facing high levels of complexity and 
uncertainty. Whether it is from the effects 
of global warming, developments in 
cloud computing, social media or political 
change and the potential for less liberal 
trading environments, the number of 
ways in which organisations can trip up 
only ever seems to increase.
In the face of this increased complexity 
and uncertainty, the temptation for 
boards is to become more conservative 
and risk averse in an attempt to create 
certainty. In practice, boards that choose 
to do this risk missing out on significant 
potential opportunities for their 
organisations and stakeholders. Worse 
still, they risk losing ground to entities 
with more innovative and entrepreneurial 
boards that are better able to steer their 
organisations towards the opportunities 
on offer. Choosing the ‘safe’ option can 
be a risky strategy in itself, as illustrated 
by companies such as IBM, which failed 
to capitalise on the personal computer, 
and Kodak, which, despite developing 
the digital camera, chose not to market it. 
Corporate governance codes and 
standards are also changing. In the US a 
major revision of the COSO Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM) Guidance was 
completed in 2017 (COSO 2017). In the 
UK, revisions to the Corporate Governance 
Code were released for consultation in 
December 2017 (FRC 2017). In both 
cases, a closer relationship between the 
strategic-management and risk-
management roles of the board has been 
proposed. In addition, there is a greater 
emphasis on ‘softer’ considerations,  
such as the culture of an organisation. 
External events such as technological 
developments, regulatory change or 
public scandals are easy to observe. It is, 
however, much more difficult to see is 
how boards are responding to the 
risk-management challenges presented 
by these events. 
The purpose of this research project was 
to investigate how boards understand 
their role in relation to risk management 
today. Specifically, the aim was to explore 
how boards satisfy their oversight 
responsibilities and evaluate their 
effectiveness and whether boards view risk 
management simply as a tool for reducing 
risk and increasing certainty, or whether risk 
management and strategic management 
are integrated to support innovation and 
the pursuit of opportunities. 
Another concern is how boards understand 
concepts such as culture (including risk 
culture) and risk appetite. Further, the 
research explored what, if any, barriers 
exist to prevent boards from having 
effective risk-management conversations, 
as well as board members’ perceptions of 
the roles of executives and non-executive 
directors in relation to risk management.
The intention is not to find fault with or 
criticise current risk-management 
practices. The researchers know 
personally the challenges that board 
directors can face in navigating a path 
that both creates value for stakeholders 
and ensures that an organisation can 
remain viable into the long term. By 
learning from the current practice of 
boards, and the views of executive and 
non-executive directors, the intention 
here is to highlight where boards have 
got to in the ‘journey’ to evermore 
successful value creation. 
Finally, this report highlights areas of 
good board-level risk-management 
practices, and provides insights that 
boards can use to enhance their practice 
further. The report also provides 
recommendations for policymakers, to 
assist in the spreading and adoption of 
good practice as well as highlighting 
areas that call for more guidance.
1.2 CONNECTING THE DOTS: 
STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE, 
PERFORMANCE AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT
‘One of the greatest benefits the board 
can bring to its management is to declare 
itself open to the discussion and the 
possibility of risk’ (consultant).
Risk management is often viewed as an 
internal control activity, protecting 
organisations from harmful events such as 
fires, employee misconduct or reputation-
damaging scandals. From this 
perspective, risk is a bad thing for 
organisations, something to be assessed 
and limited as much as possible. To the 
extent that risk is tolerated, it is done so 
only because it is an inescapable part of 
‘core’ activities such as manufacturing 
processes, marketing or service delivery.
This report does not challenge this 
perspective or existing corporate 
governance frameworks in this regard. 
Organisational scandals from Enron to 
Barings, Barclays and VW have all 
highlighted the significant damage that 
1. Introduction
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can be associated with weak governance, 
culture and control. Risk management 
provides tools that organisations can use 
to help identify and reduce the probability 
and impact of such damage.
On the other hand, neither does this report 
endorse one particular perspective or 
another. While risk management can help a 
board to control risks that may threaten the 
achievement of the organisation’s strategic 
objectives, it is also important to recognise 
the speculative dimension of managing 
risk, especially when dealing with the 
strategic-level risks that may occupy the 
attention of a board. As participants 
discussed, risk comes with the opportunity 
for returns, and even seemingly adverse 
events such as regulatory change or 
political uncertainty can create 
opportunities that may be exploited. 
Equally, highly strategic risks, such as the 
development of a new product or market, 
or an acquisition or merger, very clearly 
combine a range of positive and negative 
outcomes. In such situations, some boards 
and organisations may prefer to use terms 
other than ‘risk’, such as ‘volatility’ or 
‘opportunities and threats’ or ‘managing 
opportunity’. Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that exploiting opportunities is as 
much part of risk management as 
controlling downside outcomes, as 
participants consistently pointed out. 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS, OBJECTIVES 
AND APPROACH
The aim of the project was to explore 
current practice in board-level risk-related 
activities and to make recommendations to 
help improve the readiness of boards for the 
strategy, risk and governance challenges. 
The specific objectives were as follows.
1.  To explore how boards have 
developed and perform the following 
roles in practice: 
 a.  strategic risk management 
and decision making (seizing 
opportunities, avoiding inappropriate 
strategies, managing risks to strategic 
objectives, as well as enabling boards 
to prepare for disruptive, non-routine 
and reputational issues, such as 
‘black swan’ type risks) 
 b.  oversight of risk-management 
effectiveness (formal aspects of 
internal control)
 c.  communicating their approach  
to risk management, and
 d.  managing and embedding 
appropriate culture (including  
risk culture). 
2.  To understand the factors (eg 
regulation, stakeholder pressure, 
improvements to strategic decision 
making) that have encouraged boards 
to perform the above roles.
3.  To determine whether boards have the 
skills, experience and training 
necessary to fulfil their risk-
management roles, in increasingly 
complex risk environments.
4.  To investigate other barriers that may 
prevent boards from performing their 
risk-management roles (eg lack of skills 
within the risk function, silo-based risk 
management, complex organisational 
structures, lack of data).
5.  To examine whether there are areas of 
convergence and divergence in the 
roles of NEDs, executives and risk 
specialists in relation to the above.
In exploring board-level risk- 
management activities and in providing 
recommendations for good practice, the 
intention is not to complicate the role of 
boards. What works for one board and 
organisation may not for another. Trying 
to fit every board and organisation into a 
specific theoretical approach can be a 
thankless task; best practice can vary 
according to the nature, scale and 
complexity of an organisation’s activities, 
as well as its culture, competencies and 
resources. Consequently, this report does 
not intend to replace existing theoretical 
frameworks by proposing any new 
frameworks or risk-management tools.
Instead, the aim was to conduct the 
interviews objectively without a specific 
theoretical or conceptual agenda. This 
report intends to find out how board 
members understand their risk-
management role and make use of 
risk-management concepts and tools, 
and how they perceive the challenges 
that they face in performing their 
risk-management duties. 
Resulting suggestions for practice 
(Chapter 4) are based upon what the 
participants said about things that they 
have done that have worked and those 
that have not worked. It is for the readers 
of this report to select the ideas and 
activities that may work for them or  
their organisation.
Risk comes with the opportunity 
for returns, and even seemingly 
adverse events such as regulatory 
change or political uncertainty 
can create opportunities that  
may be exploited. 
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The next five subsections 
present the findings for each 
of the research objectives.  
The first of these was to 
explore the various roles  
that boards may perform in 
relation to risk management.
2.1 THE ROLE OF THE BOARD IN RISK 
MANAGEMENT
‘The role of the board is oversight of the 
company’s strategy and performance, in 
general and, therefore, the question of risk 
is a key element of strategy. So, assessing 
the risk implications of strategy, 
discussing risk appetite, understanding 
the elements of risk and where they sit 
in the organisation, and overseeing the 
process by which risks are monitored 
and managed and mitigated through the 
organisation’ (non-executive director).
2.1.1 Strategy governance, 
performance and risk
The above quote reflects the prevailing 
view of the participants as to the role of 
the board in risk management. All the 
participants emphasised the oversight 
role that boards have, a role highlighted in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code and 
many other governance codes worldwide.
The quote also highlights that although 
strategy and risk are connected, the 
relationship may sometimes be a linear 
one: the desired strategy is determined 
first, and then the risks that may arise 
from this strategy and its implementation 
are considered. In this context, strategy is 
the mechanism for creating value and risk 
management exists to help protect the 
value-creation process from negative 
events. This linear approach is reflected  
in the quote below from an executive 
director of a large listed company:
‘I think strategy is decided at some 
point... And once you’ve agreed that, then 
you say right, okay, for us to get there, 
that is not going to be easy, and yes, there 
are risks associated with that, and that 
each of those risks, here is the impact, 
and here is where the impact is going to 
be. And then it’s a question of “how do 
you manage it?”’ (executive director).
The quote highlights a potential issue 
with an overly linear approach to strategy 
and risk. In taking this approach, risk is 
generally viewed in terms of the 
probability and impact of loss, so the focus 
is on the minimisation of risk associated 
with downside possibilities. Viewing risk 
as ‘bad’ means that the potential for 
better-than-expected outcomes may be 
overlooked. It may also foster high levels of 
risk aversion in boards, a problem that was 
identified by a number of the participants 
in both large and SME organisations.  
The consequence of this approach is  
that innovations may be missed.
‘In some areas there should be a 
willingness to proactively take risk and 
indeed that to take no risk is potentially 
the biggest risk of all because there’s a 
possibility that people innovate around 
you, you’re left standing, and as time 
goes by you become the dinosaur in 
comparison to the rest of the sector’ 
(non-executive director).
Even where risk is viewed more positively, 
there remains a danger that its significance 
is underestimated or that strategic-level 
risks are not viewed as risks:
‘...it’s very easy to say, “yes, we’re doing 
this… but we don’t need to consider risk 
because it is just a strategic direction 
and we know there will be risk in that”. 
Actually you do need to take that step 
back of formally considering the risk 
in order to get the benefits of the risk 
management in there. 
...quite often people think, actually, 
yes, we deal with risk every day, and, 
therefore, we don’t actually need to focus 
on specific risk management; and that’s a 
bit dangerous’ (executive director).
In a small number of organisations strategy 
setting and risk were integrated to a much 
greater extent. The directors of these 
organisations indicated that their boards 
considered the risks associated with 
choosing or not choosing specific strategic 
options at the strategy setting phase, as 
well as the organisation’s risk-management 
competencies and capabilities. 
Such discussions were not necessarily 
structured in a formal way, nor did they 
tend to use terms such as ‘risk’ or ‘risk 
management’. Despite the relatively 
unstructured nature of their approach, 
these boards were more likely to exploit 
opportunities even when faced with 
seemingly adverse events, such as the 
economic consequences of the EU 
referendum, the election of President 
Trump and his America First agenda or 
government welfare changes.
2. Findings
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Case studies: Turning 
adversity into opportunity
An SME component manufacturer was 
concerned about the election of Donald Trump 
as president and the potential for increased 
tariffs on goods imported to the US. As a result, 
the firm created a US subsidiary to manufacture 
components for its American customers. 
A Housing Association was concerned about 
the implications of the UK government’s Welfare 
Reform Act 2016 on its financial sustainability. In 
response, the board created a strategic planning 
forum led by NEDs with executive input. The 
revised strategy led to a major restructuring 
and the development of new housing products 
and markets, all with the aim of meeting the 
needs of both existing and future tenants.
2.1.2 The principled–prescriptive 
spectrum
There is a spectrum of practice as to 
how structured or unstructured a board’s 
approach is to risk management.  
This spectrum also goes beyond the 
structural nature of a board’s approach, 
and includes factors like: how risk is 
perceived (as an opportunity or a 
compliance matter); board level and 
organisational cultures in relation to 
risk; and the board’s approach to 
communication. Figure 2.1 explains  
the two extremes of this spectrum.
A number of the participants discussed 
elements of the two approaches. It is 
important to stress that one approach  
is not necessarily better than the other. 
The appropriate approach may be 
influenced by industry sector, the level  
of regulation and the size or purpose  
of an organisation. For example, all  
the boards of the financial services 
organisations in the sample tended to be 
prescriptive in their approach, primarily 
because of high levels of regulation.  
In contrast, the SME boards tended to 
be more principled in approach. 
Each approach has strengths and 
weaknesses, especially in organisations 
whose boards are close to one of the 
ends of the spectrum. For example, 
there were claims that an extremely 
prescriptive risk-management approach 
may cause board-level risk-management 
activities to become static and reactive, 
with board members getting lost in 
operational detail (a potential problem 
made worse by lengthy risk registers) and 
taking an overly negative view of risk. 
Each approach has strengths 
and weaknesses, especially 
in organisations whose 
boards are close to one of 
the ends of the spectrum. 
1  The terms ‘principled approach’ and ‘prescriptive approach’ came from the study participants. At its extreme, the prescriptive approach is intended to capture an approach focused exclusively on 
risk compliance and procedures. On the other hand, the principled approach is intended to reflect an approach that, at its extreme, focuses on the ‘in-principle’ business objectives of a board to 
the exclusion of explicit risk-management compliance and procedures.
FIGURE 2.1: Principled–Prescriptive spectrum1
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In contrast, participants warned that 
boards following an extremely principled 
approach may make inconsistent decisions 
and may pursue upside opportunities at 
any cost, exposing an organisation to 
excessive amounts of risk. There is also the 
danger that boards that appear to adopt 
a principled approach are not actually 
discussing risk and risk management in a 
sufficiently explicit way. It suggests that 
an appropriate balance must be struck.
‘When you start to scratch away from 
the surface, you hear, “actually, no,  
that did go wrong”, or “actually, yes, 
we didn’t consider how these risks link 
together”… there’s almost like a sort 
of bravado that you often hear about: 
“of course, we do this stuff”. But it’s the 
question of when should you have more 
explicit and formal consideration of risk: 
at what junctures will that add value?’ 
(Focus group member).
It should be emphasised that while boards 
following a principled approach were 
more likely to make connections between 
strategy and risk, this does not guarantee 
that they will make successful connections. 
Equally boards following a prescriptive 
approach may be just as capable of 
connecting strategy and risk and when they 
do so are likely to make more considered 
and consistent decisions. Each type of 
organisation has to work to overcome its 
own limitations in this regard. ‘Principled 
approach’ boards should guard against 
excessive opportunism and inconsistent 
risk-management decisions, and find 
ways to anchor their discussions, linking 
back to the organisation’s risk appetite 
statement, for example. In contrast, 
prescriptive approach boards should 
avoid focusing too closely on internal 
controls, as this may cause excessive risk 
aversion and a failure to exploit value-
enhancing strategic opportunities.
2.1.3 Risk appetite and setting 
parameters
One concept that can help to improve 
the decision-making consistency of more 
principle-oriented boards, and help to 
overcome the negativity associated with 
the prescriptive approach, is risk appetite. 
Most of the participants used the concept 
in their organisations to some degree, 
although it appeared that there was little 
agreement on how to express this in a 
quantitative way. Often risk appetite 
might be expressed qualitatively in  
terms of risks that organisations might 
want to take or avoid, or less explicitly  
in terms of organisational values and 
ethics (eg attitudes towards compliance 
breaches, misconduct).
Participants said that a key benefit of 
thinking about risk appetite was to help 
boards set the parameters within which 
the executive directors and wider senior 
management team could operate on a 
day-to-day basis. This approach provides 
clarity about the risks that may be taken and 
those that should be treated with caution, 
as well as how risk-management activities 
and processes should be conducted across 
the organisation. Setting parameters is hard 
if there are no clearly defined quantitative 
limits: but the following comment 
indicates that there is readily available 
information to support the process. 
‘So the classic thing, zero harm – we’ve 
got no appetite for something – it’s a 
complete misunderstanding of what risk 
appetite is. There is a wealth of metrics 
and information out there that you can 
tap into to articulate statements in a 
way which will actually add practical 
guidance to a business, and you’d be able 
to measure whether you’re operating 
within those parameters. But a lot of 
companies are just nowhere… they’re still 
doing the sort of high, medium and low, 
hungry-averse-type scales, which are just 
worthless’ (Focus group).
2.1.4 Culture, communication and risk
An organisation’s culture can have a 
significant effect on how people within the 
organisation behave and communicate 
with each other. This can influence the 
tendency for misconduct as well as how 
risk and risk management are perceived 
(eg whether risk management is seen as a 
business enabler or bureaucratic red-
tape) and reported. Events such as the 
Barclays LIBOR scandal clearly illustrate 
such connections (Salz 2013).
On organisational culture and the specific 
aspects of culture related to risk taking 
and control (so called ‘risk culture’), 
participants claimed that culture was not 
discussed in an explicit way by most of 
the boards in the sample, and risk culture 
was hardly ever discussed or understood 
as a discrete concept. Outside financial 
services, only two boards regularly 
discussed culture in relation to risk and 
this was because one was in a people-
focused business and the other had a  
risk director responsible for focusing on 
culture, and risk culture in particular. 
An organisation’s culture 
can have a significant effect 
on how people within the 
organisation behave and 
communicate with each other.
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Other non-financial services organisations 
only discussed culture at board level on 
an ad hoc basis, for example in relation to 
major change projects, or the appointment 
of a new CEO or chair. Risk culture was 
not generally discussed by non-financial 
organisation. In contrast the boards of all 
the financial services organisations in the 
sample looked at culture and explicitly at 
risk culture. Regulation was cited as the 
main reason for this.
Outside financial services, attempts to 
assess culture formally may have been 
rare, but the value of doing so was 
recognised by some of the participants:
‘…you’ve got to have a definition of 
what you think the culture is. And then 
you’ve got to have metrics which help 
you determine whether that culture, in 
fact, exists. And those…might involve 
employees’ feedback surveys, discussions 
with focus groups of employees... There 
are practical steps that boards and 
management take to determine whether 
… the culture they aspire to is, in fact, the 
culture that is operating in the business.’ 
(Non-executive director)
On the subject of communication many 
of the participants did make links 
between this and culture, and in particular 
the importance of an appropriate ‘tone 
from the top’ in relation to risk taking and 
control. Several of the participants also 
emphasised the importance of the 
board’s ‘talking the talk’ and ‘walking the 
walk’ to ensure that people within the 
organisation would believe that the board 
took the management of risk seriously.
Opinion was split on how communication 
between the board and the wider 
business should be achieved. In some 
organisations, boards communicated via 
the executive team and communication 
tended to be top-down. In others, 
non-executive members of the board 
communicated directly with a range of 
people, not just the executive, and 
communication was more integrated. 
Those with a top-down approach put a 
greater emphasis on maintaining board 
independence and the avoidance of it 
becoming overly operational. 
Those with a top-down 
approach put a greater 
emphasis on maintaining 
board independence and the 
avoidance of it becoming 
overly operational. 
An SME Perspective
Investigating the role of the board in  
strategy governance, performance and risk 
identified some findings specific to SMEs  
that are worth highlighting. 
A number of participants had executive and 
non-executive director experience with SMEs. 
These directors commented that SME boards 
tend to be more innovation-focused and will get 
involved in entrepreneurial activities. They said 
that this is driven in part by the need for SMEs 
to innovate to survive in highly competitive 
marketplaces (as they often have less financial 
security or brand reputation to fall back on than 
larger organisations), but it was also a consequence of increased agility and the closer 
proximity of the board to the wider business. SME boards appeared to be able to make 
strategic decisions to exploit new opportunities that could be implemented quickly.
Nonetheless, it was also observed that SME boards can be more short-term and reactive in 
their approach, primarily because of their higher risk of failure. Formal risk management 
conversations were comparatively rare in participant SMEs, suggesting a more principled 
approach (in the sense used in section 2.1.2 above). In general, risk management was 
considered formally only once or twice a year, in relation to topics of regulatory significance 
such as health and safety.
SME board members were also much more likely to have closer communication with the 
wider business, and some of the SME participants with risk-management expertise were 
helping their organisations to drive significant improvements in practice. Participants 
explained that the smaller size of SMEs made it easier for board members to get to know 
the wider management team of their organisation. In addition, board members may 
possess skills that are not present anywhere else in the organisation (eg specialist 
knowledge of risk management) and that enable the business to be driven forward.
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2.2 DRIVERS FOR BOARD 
INVOLVEMENT IN RISK MANAGEMENT
This section is concerned with key  
drivers that participants believed were 
prompting risk discussions and activities 
in boardrooms. The responses may be, to 
some degree, regarded as reflecting the 
spectrum identified in section 2.1.2. On 
the one hand, a number of the motivations 
identified could be considered to fall 
within a strategic, or value creation, 
perspective. On the other hand, another 
set of motivations might be regarded as 
inclining more towards a regulatory 
governance, or value preservation, 
perspective. Significantly, there appeared 
to be an increasing recognition of the 
importance of board-level risk discussions.
The themes presented below are ordered 
according to the importance assigned to 
them by the participants. Regulatory drivers 
were by far the most cited reasons for 
board-level risk discussions and activities.
2.2.1 Regulation and compliance – 
requirements and influences
The direct impact of regulation
Legislation, regulatory requirements, 
corporate codes and professional codes 
of conduct were regarded by many 
participants as having a direct effect on 
attitudes and practices in relation to risk 
management. There was an acceptance 
that sometimes this might lead to a ‘tick 
box’ approach:
‘..I do think there are times when you 
do need to tick some boxes, by the way, 
because you have lists of compliance 
matrices that you have to follow, and  
you have to show that you’ve followed 
them, and the best way of doing that is 
to tick a box to say that you’ve done it.’ 
(non-executive director) 
Nonetheless, some also recognised that 
adopting a ‘compliance mind-set’ 
reflected the more prescriptive approach 
to risk management outlined in section 
2.1.2, a situation that may foster excessive 
risk aversion: ‘it’s the mind-set of actually, 
rather than helping us take risks better it’s 
about not taking risks at all’ (executive 
director). It was also clear that many saw 
the influence of regulation and regulators 
at work directly in day-to-day risk-
management practice in areas of risk such 
as governance, culture and strategy. 
Specific examples are set out in Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1: Examples of regulatory influence on boardroom decision making
AREA OF REGULATORY 
INFLUENCE
EXAMPLE
Risk appetite
Boards are more conscious of 
their role in risk oversight
‘The risk-appetite framework and risk-appetite statements  
are very much something that the board seems to feed into.  
We are seeing,… through regulatory pressure, to evidence  
more what the board are actually doing in the oversight piece’  
(executive director)
Committee structure
Board members may not be 
clear as to the responsibilities 
of the committee versus  
the board
‘If the regulator wants the board to be more collectively involved 
in everything,.. why make us have separate committees?’ 
(executive director)
Board member responsibility
The role of chairman in setting 
the culture is clear in the 
current regulatory framework
‘There’s a prescribed responsibility for culture within the 
organisation that resides with the chairman. And our  
chairman is fairly conscious of ensuring that he can fulfil that...’ 
(executive director)
Horizon scanning and 
scenario planning
Some boards are actively using 
horizon scanning and scenario 
planning in fulfilling their 
oversight responsibilities.  
This may include the use of 
internally generated scans and 
external resources, such as risk 
reports by regulators.
‘There’s some really good external publications that are put out 
by the regulator…they’ll do a review themselves of all of the 
concerns and risks that they’ve identified through the course of 
the year…[and]…more broadly looking forward as well and 
thinking, what are the things that are keeping the regulator 
awake at night?…that’s a key document really for any kind of …
audit and risk committee to be poring through and saying, right, 
here are the 10 risks the regulator has identified as being really 
key and on its mind. 
‘Where do we sit against these 10 risks? What are we doing  
in relation to these 10 risks? Are these risks we’re aware of?  
We do that exercise proactively…cross-check or cross-reference  
to say…these are the key risks, these are the ones that appear on 
our register, these are the ones that don’t appear on our strategic 
risk register, and these are the reasons why. This is one that…  
we didn’t have previously as a risk. We’ve rated it here. It’s not  
on a strategic, [but] it’s on an operational risk register’ 
(executive director)
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appeared to be an 
increasing recognition of 
the importance of board-
level risk discussions.
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Regulatory requirements and statements 
influence the strategy, structures, 
practices and behaviours of organisations 
in more or less subtle ways. This is also 
having an effect on risk-management 
practices among organisations operating 
within less-regulated sectors. Firstly, 
board members who have worked in 
regulated environments appear to see 
the benefit of transposing these 
regulation-driven, risk-management 
practice into other organisations.
‘I joined the board…and we also had 
a new chairman at the same time and 
we both come from working in a highly 
regulated environment…and we were a 
little surprised at the lack of risk expertise 
and focus on risk that we found when we 
joined the business so I think it’s probably 
fair to say that the impetus [for changing 
things] was driven by the chairman and 
then myself with the recognition that 
really we have to get the organisation up 
to speed ... around risk’ (consultant).
Secondly, there is also recognition that 
even in less regulated environments 
boards are nevertheless being held  
more accountable for their decisions  
by stakeholders. 
‘In a non-regulated organisation the risk 
has always been there, but … I’m seeing 
in some of the stuff I’ve done more of a 
move towards, not the level of stuff that’s 
expected by the FCA from a regulated 
body, but it’s a move towards that 
direction, a greater scrutiny, a greater… 
assessment. … The concept of holding to 
account of directors by shareholders is out 
there and it’s coming with a bit of a force’ 
(non-executive director).
Embedding regulatory impact  
within organisations
Participants spoke of the increasing 
recognition and importance of risk, and 
risk management practices, at board 
level. This attitude, and the pervasiveness 
of the influence of regulation discussed 
above, was reflected by a number of the 
participants in discussing the relevance of 
risk culture, or their role in embedding 
risk awareness, in their organisation. 
‘One of the things that… is generally 
accepted [is] that boards need to be 
involved in…agreeing … what the overall 
risk appetite of the business is. How 
can you do that if you don’t understand 
the concepts of the culture in which 
risk appetite is articulated and agreed, 
because they’re entwined with each other. 
They’re part of the same thing’ (non-
executive director).
From a board perspective, this is important 
for two reasons. Firstly, and as has been  
a key theme of financial regulators  
(FSB 2014), if the ‘right’ risk culture is 
embedded in an organisation then this 
provides additional assurance to a board 
about the effective operation of the 
organisation’s risk framework. Secondly, it 
explains the importance that many of the 
participants placed upon ‘tone at the top’ 
and the non-executive board members’ 
understanding of what was happening on 
the ground and checking this against 
their experience at board level.
‘First of all, the tone has to come 
from the top so if your…board thinks 
about risk management in terms of...a 
compliance exercise, it will always 
remain a parallel process. It will never 
be embedded in the day-to-day work, 
in the day-to-day operating model of 
the company. And therefore it will never 
be part of discussion at board level’ 
(executive director).
The report will further discuss the 
importance of the board’s understanding 
of what is happening on the ground in 
the wider organisation in section 2.3.
2.2.2 Oversight: reputation and 
emerging risks
Governance and oversight of their 
organisations was often mentioned by 
participants when discussing the 
importance of risk at board level. This  
was often associated with compliance. 
Non-executives need to be assured that 
executives have ensured there is an 
appropriate risk-management framework 
that is operating effectively. In this context 
of governance and oversight, two specific 
drivers were mentioned consistently: 
reputation and emerging risks.
Board role in protecting and  
enhancing reputation
‘Reputation is kind of an interesting one, 
because it tends to be an underestimated 
risk by management, I think, and yet 
you can point to examples in the public 
domain where people have suffered quite 
badly from reputational risk or having  
a bad reputation for something...’  
(non-executive director).
Non-executives need to be 
assured that executives have 
ensured there is an appropriate 
risk-management framework 
that is operating effectively. 
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This was emphasised particularly by 
organisations that were customer facing, 
focused on ensuring they had the trust 
and confidence of their customers. For 
example, the significance of this issue for 
oversight and governance is apparent in 
the experience of the financial services 
sector and its efforts to gain or regain the 
trust of the general public after the 
financial crisis of 2007–8.
While discussions about reputation often 
took place in the context of protecting 
value – perhaps the more customary 
‘defensive’ risk governance perspective 
– it was also recognised that effective 
management of risks to reputation could 
also enhance reputation:
‘And we’ve seen some of that in the last 
five years, I would suggest in some of 
the cyberattacks that have happened to 
major organisations. Some have handled 
them very badly and have upset their 
customers and had their reputation 
damaged. Others have managed it really 
well, really transparently and have done 
a great deal to enhance reputation, and in 
fact their share price’ (consultant).
Emerging risks and incidents
A wide range of external events (eg 
sectoral risk events, political and socio-
economic events, media reports) were 
reported as common drivers for board-
level discussions about risk:
‘Boards don’t know what they don’t 
know. So, if something happens outside 
that you believe will have a substantial 
impact on the business, the board then 
has to have a conversation about it’ 
(non-executive director).
In turn, this echoed participants’ 
discussion of the importance of the 
diversity of the board in bringing a range 
of (‘outside’) expertise and experience to 
risk discussions (see section 2.3.1 for 
further discussion of board diversity);  
of scenario planning as a tool for 
anticipating new or developing risks (such 
as cyber risk); and of horizon scanning in 
actively researching and examining the 
implications of what is happening to 
competitors and similar organisations, as 
well as in the socio-economic environment 
in which the business is operating.
2.2.3 Strategy – value creation, risk 
appetite and the pursuit of 
opportunities
In addition to regulation and compliance 
as a driver of board-level risk discussions, 
participants also emphasised strategic 
drivers. This echoes again the 
prescriptive-principled spectrum 
discussed in section 2.1.2.
What was stressed by a number of 
participants was the need for discussion 
of risk at a strategic level – not at a level of 
governance and oversight that dwells on 
risk registers and frameworks – in order to 
be able to take advantage of opportunities.
‘What really could unseat the strategic 
objectives of the business? What 
really are those opportunities that the 
business might be missing because it’s 
too conservative in its risk appetite. And 
then real discussions are not so much 
risks, but they are issues that affect 
the risk and the environment in which 
the organisation is trading. And it’s 
absolutely vital that the board has the 
opportunity and the education to allow 
them to have those kinds of discussions’ 
(non-executive director).
In having these discussions, participants 
emphasised how important it is that a 
clear understanding of the organisation’s 
risk appetite is embedded in strategic 
decision making. It was also suggested by 
some participants that this is key to acting 
strategically in a fast-moving environment:
‘in order for the board to achieve their 
strategy, people needed to be doing things 
differently, faster and making different 
decisions. So that was actually key about 
making sure that the risk appetite in the 
business or the definition of risk in the 
business underpins the strategy. They 
couldn’t do the strategy without that 
right risk appetite’ (executive director). 
This reflects back to the discussion in 
section 2.1.1 concerning the relevance of 
risk in strategy setting. 
What was stressed by a number 
of participants was the need for 
discussion of risk at a strategic 
level ... in order to be able to 
take advantage of opportunities.
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2.3 BOARD SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE
This section considers the skills and 
experience that are brought to bear on 
strategic decision making within the 
boardroom in relation to risk management.
‘Understanding risk management,  
the risk–reward equation, is  
fundamental to the role of the board’ 
(non-executive director).
2.3.1 Board diversity – Risk skills, 
knowledge, experience, education  
and training (RI-SKeet)
Throughout the interviews and subsequent 
focus groups, it became apparent that 
diversity was central to a board’s ability to 
manage risk. This concept of diversity (in 
its broadest sense) was especially 
pronounced when discussing the 
composition of NEDs required to enable 
the board to understand the ‘risk-reward 
equation’. This diversity came in various 
guises throughout the interviews, 
summarised here as Risk Intelligence, 
Skills, Knowledge, Experience, Education, 
and Training (RI-SKeet, Figure 2.2). The 
enrichment and enhancement of strategic 
decision making brought about through 
RI-SKeet ensures a collective board 
intelligence that is balanced, allowing it 
to understand fully the dynamics of the 
risk–reward equation.
Diversity was also seen by some 
participants as a way of ‘de-risking’ the 
board, broadening opinion and enabling 
non-executives to pool their RI-SKeet.  
In addition, RI-SKeet was regarded as  
a source of competitive advantage  
for organisations.
‘If you have an organisation, for example, that’s had a board composed 
of people who’ve come up through the ranks, understand the culture of the 
organisation and understand what really makes it tick and how things, 
how politics work, and how communication really works in practice, 
and you have non-execs who all come from the same industry, then you 
have a board that is very good at understanding what I would describe 
as internal risk…[But] if they lack true exec and non-exec members 
who have come from outside of the organisation and ideally outside the 
industry, then they will lack that external perspective and there will be a 
lens around the board room table that is missing’ (consultant).
Throughout the interviews 
and subsequent focus groups, 
it became apparent that 
diversity was central to a 
board’s ability to manage risk.
FIGURE 2.2: RI-SKeet
Technical and ethical 
competencies (TEQ)
Skills
KnowledgeEducation
Training
Risk Intelligence
Experience
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The ability of a board to anticipate risk 
and identify opportunities underlines  
how strategic decisions may be enhanced 
by a diverse RI-Skeet board. Such 
opportunities may not be as apparent to 
executives owing to their involvement in 
the day-to-day workings of the 
organisation. A highly functioning board 
with good RI-SKeet can provide an 
accelerator and a brake when considering 
the risk-reward equation as part of its 
strategic decision making. 
Ensuring boards remain risk-relevant
Organisations within the study have, 
through a number of mechanisms, 
actively sought to increase RI-SKeet 
within their boardrooms in an attempt to 
ensure that consideration of risk is 
embedded in strategic decision making.
A large proportion of organisations in the 
sample employed board skills matrices 
and audits to evaluate areas of perceived 
overlap or insufficiency on their board.  
As one participant stated:
‘one of the things we do is a skills audit, 
or skills review every now and again, to 
say what are we missing, what skills are 
we missing. We type [sic.] that into our 
strategy as well’ (non-executive director).
The organisation referred to in the above 
quote was a relatively small SME 
operating in the third sector, yet it still 
recognised the importance of aligning 
the board’s RI-SKeet to the organisation’s 
mission and business model. Matrices 
and subsequent audits of board skills in 
RI-SKeet become particularly important 
when bringing non-executives on to the 
board, as this is seen as an opportunity for 
ensuring that the board remains risk-
relevant while ‘future proofing’ against 
the ever-changing business environment 
in which the organisation finds itself. 
Board transition arrangements are not the 
only means of ensuring that a board 
remains diverse in RI-SKeet. A number of 
participants, both executive directors and 
NEDs, highlighted the importance of 
ensuring that the board knows the 
business, is aware of its idiosyncrasies, 
and understands the culture of the 
business on the shop floor, as outlined  
in section 2.1 below. This process of 
‘kicking the tyres’ by getting out of the 
boardroom and into the business itself 
was seen by some as a process that allows 
the board to ensure they are risk-relevant, 
getting a sense of the ‘qualitative’ that is 
so often lost in risk registers.
‘I know the chairman of one company… 
they [sic] always have their lunch with 
the employees, they never go and sit in  
a separate dining room. And when they 
say you can come and have a chat with 
me and tell me what you think they  
mean it…I think it’s something that a 
lot more boards are doing now than they 
ever did before. They cannot hide away 
in an ivory tower, they need to actually 
understand the business. If you’re  
going to govern something you must  
have a decent level of understanding,  
otherwise how on earth can you govern?’ 
(non-executive director). 
Case study: RI-SKeet in 
the boardroom
An SME third-sector investment 
company with credit risk ratings higher 
than would be found among commercial 
lenders was required to develop a risk 
register and robust business strategy as 
part of its funder’s conditions of 
business. In order to do so, the board 
went on an away day to determine the 
principal risks to the business and 
discuss how they fitted within the 
company’s strategy and mission. In doing 
so, the board was then able to use its 
RI-SKeet matrix to determine the most 
appropriate director to take ownership 
of that risk on the risk register, thus 
providing accountability and leadership 
of those risks from within the boardroom.
A qualitative understanding of the 
business also allows NEDs to obtain 
assurances about what they are hearing 
within the boardroom. 
‘What you don’t want to happen is 
that the chief executive is telling you 
everything’s rosy in the garden, but when 
you go out in the field, you find that all 
the things that you’ve been  
told are rosy aren’t really happening’ 
(non-executive director).
The presence of gaps in board RI-SKeet 
was not uncommon throughout the study, 
with a particular emphasis on emerging 
areas of potential exposure. For example, 
the effects of merger and acquisition on 
the risk-relevance of the board and the 
prevalence of cyber risk in organisations 
were seen as particularly pertinent by 
The ability of a board to 
anticipate risk and identify 
opportunities underlines 
how strategic decisions 
may be enhanced by a 
diverse RI-Skeet board.
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some participants, with the latter being 
related on multiple occasions to a 
well-known large-scale hacking event in  
a telecommunications company. 
This event provided boards with a near-miss 
scenario that placed cyber risk as a focal 
point of discussions within the boardroom. 
It was apparent that potential near misses 
(proactive) and actual losses (reactive) 
were extremely important in prompting 
explicit and strategic risk discussions in 
the boardroom. This emphasises the 
significance of such events as a driver for 
risk discussion (as outlined in section 2.2).
It was also clear that boards use the 
expertise of external and internal risk 
specialists in an attempt to provide 
RI-SKeet in areas in which they have a 
particular lack of expertise. While this is 
especially common in relation to financial 
misstatement risk, via the use of external 
auditors (the risk specialists for financial 
misstatement risks), it was suggested that 
the use of other types of risk specialists (eg 
cyber risk or health and safety specialists) 
was just as relevant for other areas.
‘Having finances misstated is a risk, 
and therefore [external] auditing is 
well known [as a means of mitigating 
financial misstatement risk] and 
everybody assumes it’s there. But doing 
the same on health and safety or on IT is 
also, to me, a logical step, if that’s one of 
your risks’ (non-executive director).
Risk specialists also enhance the risk-
relevance of a board through facilitating 
the explicit discussion of risk at away-
days, in which time is dedicated to 
strategic ‘deep dives’ of risk issues. 
was not enough board training was 
because it is generally assumed that risk 
management is something anyone can do, 
because they do it unconsciously every day.
2.4 BARRIERS TO BOARD 
INVOLVEMENT IN RISK 
MANAGEMENT
This section examines the barriers that 
prevent a board from managing risk 
effectively. The research objective was to 
identify common barriers that can impede 
the functioning of a risk-sensitive board.
‘The problem with risk is that if  
you don’t keep it alive it will die’ 
(executive director).
Many participants made it clear 
throughout the interviews that, in order  
to be able to consider risk strategically, 
boards need to be aware of, and 
understand, how risk ‘lives’ in their 
organisation. Risk needs to be alive and 
visible at board level to enable meaningful 
discussion. Yet, the process of making risk 
more visible to the board is fraught with 
difficulties as there are multiple barriers 
that inhibit this from occurring. 
It is evident from the interviews that  
the majority of these barriers fall within 
two categories; these are ‘cognitive 
impediments’, which reduce a board’s 
ability to make risk-sensitive strategic 
decisions, and ‘social obstructions’, 
which suppress risk-relevant dialogue in 
the boardroom. As shown in Figure 2.3, 
the board’s-eye view of the organisation 
becomes blurred because these  
barriers filter out a holistic view of the 
organisation. It is also important to note 
Risk specialists also enhance the 
risk-relevance of a board through 
facilitating the explicit discussion 
of risk at away-days, in which 
time is dedicated to strategic 
‘deep dives’ of risk issues. 
Case study: using external 
specialists to enhance  
RI-SKeet
In the aftermath of two publicly reported 
hacking incidents it was acknowledged 
by a manufacturing company that its 
board’s RI-SKeet regarding the cyber 
domain was weak. The board 
supplemented the relevant RI-SKeet by 
bringing in an external specialist to 
advise the members; during this audit, 
the company actually came under attack 
by a foreign entity attempting to steal 
intellectual property. It was 
acknowledged that had the board not 
been proactive in obtaining this expertise 
it would have been a ‘disaster’ for the 
company as its products could have 
been made available on the grey market.
These discussions are further supported 
through the use of scenario exercises that 
allow the board to understand its 
members’ strengths and weaknesses in 
prevention of and responsiveness to risk, 
as well as the pressure points around 
RI-SKeet, risk ownership, and risk appetite 
that require attention. 
In order to ensure that boards remain 
risk-relevant, and taking into account the 
findings of skills matrices, audits and 
scenarios, there was an understanding 
from participants that training is beneficial, 
particularly for ‘killer issues’. Even so, this 
attitude was not unanimous, especially 
among participants in the SME sector, 
where risk training (whether in-house or 
external) at board level is less prevalent. 
This was articulated by one executive 
director, who stated that the reason there 
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n Cognitive filters (2.4.1)
n Social filters (2.4.2)
TIME PRESSURE
STATIC RISK DATA
ORGANISATIONAL COMPLEXITY
NO SAFE-ZONE
THE ORGANISATION
21 3
1  Risk Committee
2  Risk Specialists
3  Audit committee
BOARDS EYE VIEW
FIGURE 2.3: A boards eye view of the organisation
To bring risk back into focus,  
the board may make use of various 
committees and specialists as 
lenses through which to see the 
organisation closely.
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that the presence of ‘social obstruction’ 
may facilitate the creation of a ‘cognitive 
impediment’ and vice versa.
To bring risk back into focus, the board 
may make use of various committees and 
specialists as lenses through which to see 
the organisation closely. However, our 
participants observed that the existence 
of these risk focal-lenses does not 
sufficiently compensate the loss of vision 
caused by these barriers. Therefore, 
participants considered it important to 
reduce the internal barriers to increase 
the ability of the board to obtain a holistic 
view of the organisation that is grounded 
in knowledge and understanding.
2.4.1 Cognitive impediments 
Cognitive impediment 1: Static risk data
The majority of respondents, regardless 
of industry or scale of operations, 
emphasised that the single largest 
impediment to a functioning, risk-sensitive 
board is the inability to obtain an adequate 
view of the health of the company through 
the board papers. The ability to move 
away from vast static risk registers that are 
essentially backward looking, towards a 
dynamic view of the real-world impact of 
risks on the activities of the organisation, 
was something that many have aspired 
to, but few have actually achieved, in their 
board’s approach to risk registers. All too 
often, and much to the disappointment  
of some participants, the use of risk 
registers was seen as a ‘tick-box’ exercise 
characterised as compliance, as opposed 
to one of many sources of information 
pertinent to strategic decision making. 
In an attempt to ensure that standing 
items on risk registers do not lead to 
complacency, some participants 
highlighted the importance of focusing 
on ‘emerging’ and ‘moving’ risks. This 
approach has three benefits. Firstly, it 
ensures that information going to the 
board remains relevant and forward-
looking. Secondly, it ensures that the 
board does not become overly involved 
in operational issues arising from the risk 
register, as highlighted by one executive 
director: ‘If they start talking about the 
99th risk on the register, they’re getting 
too much into the operational’. Thirdly, 
providing information on developing risk 
situations enables risk conversations that 
help to mitigate potential losses and 
exploit strategic opportunities.
The ability to provide a bottom-up 
synthesis of information that makes the 
invisible visible, while reducing the 
overburdening amount of risk information 
the board receives, can improve general 
enquiry and strategic decision-making 
within the boardroom.
Cognitive impediment 2: 
Organisational complexity
As explained by the participants, the 
ability of a board to make risk visible is 
hampered by organisational complexity. 
This complexity makes the setting of 
decision-making parameters difficult for 
boards. This is further accentuated by 
static risk data that is backward looking 
and potentially irrelevant to challenges 
the business currently faces internally  
and within its environment. As outlined  
by one participant:
‘the big complex ERM systems, which 
take an enormous amount of time to 
gather [information on], and information 
is providing a picture of what was, 
as opposed to…what is currently 
pulsing around you in the organisation’  
(executive director).
Further, in the context of the ‘prescriptive’ 
and ‘principled’ approaches to making 
decisions on strategic risks outlined in 
section 2.1.2, it was suggested that more 
complex ‘principled’ organisations should 
have visible anchors to ensure that 
business critical issues are not missed,  
for example risk metrics and currently 
significant risks from the risk register.
As explained by the 
participants, the ability 
of a board to make risk 
visible is hampered by 
organisational complexity. 
Case study: when static 
data (unfortunately) 
becomes reality
A company was considering a large-
scale IT reconfiguration project 
throughout its business operations. 
During this process, a crucial strategic 
decision on whether to proceed with the 
project was brought to the board for 
consideration. Given the time it had 
taken to implement the project, by the 
time the end-to-end system was fully 
implemented the business had changed 
its strategic direction and the system 
was no longer fit for purpose. 
It turned out subsequently that the 
report presented to the board contained 
many technological terms, and detailed 
a combination of risks associated with 
the functionality that was being 
designed and their relevance to the 
changes of business strategy. When an 
investigation as to the cause of delay 
had been completed, it turned out that 
the board had found the report difficult 
to understand owing to the volume of 
technical terms contained. As a result, 
the board had been unable to consider 
the issues effectively and efficiently when 
considering the viability of the project. 
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‘If somebody is doing a good job…they 
are smartly and honestly saying ‘here are 
the three things we are most worried about 
at the moment’ (executive director).
By contrast, more complex ‘prescriptive’ 
organisations may get lost in the detail 
and become overly risk averse in their 
approach to strategic decision making. 
Given the effect of static risk data and 
organisational complexity on decision 
making within the boardroom, 
participants emphasised that audit and/or 
risk committees create a vital conduit 
through which to ensure the timely flow 
and filtering of relevant information to the 
board. It was unfortunate in the above 
static data case study that this practice was 
not conducted sufficiently thoroughly, and 
the consequences of this were sizeable 
for the organisation in question. The 
ability of these committees, along with 
the support of risk specialists, to reduce 
the cognitive burden on board members 
allows the board to focus its RI-SKeet on 
making better decisions on strategic risks.
2.4.2 Social obstructions
Social obstruction 1: Risk safe zone
‘The fact that challenge is there  
makes the executive work harder’  
(non-executive director).
Turning to the social obstructions to 
board involvement in risk management, 
participants noted the difficulties 
associated with enabling debate and 
challenge in the boardroom, especially 
when discussing sensitive risk-
management issues (for example, ‘bad 
news’ events such as major fraud or 
reputational damage). To help facilitate 
debate and challenge, a number of 
participants recommended creating a 
‘safe-zone’ atmosphere for risk-
management discussions, where 
constructive dissent and disagreement is 
encouraged within a non-judgemental 
and supportive environment. 
This creation of a safe-zone in which 
concerns around risk at board level can 
be expressed freely and without 
discrimination allows RI-SKeet to be used 
more resourcefully. This resourcefulness 
arises from improved transparency and 
increased trust within the board because 
it allows non-executives to speak ‘truth to 
power’ (executive director), while 
respecting the insights of the executive 
(see also section 2.5.2). This ability to 
create an open and transparent arena for 
discussion alleviates the psychological 
burden of challenge: 
‘in a really deep personal level it’s really 
tiring to consistently put yourself in the 
way of asking the difficult questions’ 
(executive director). 
It was acknowledged by one of the 
participants that the creation of a ‘safe 
zone’ can be taken a step further by 
holding separate non-executive ‘in-
camera’ sessions. The specific function  
of these is to allow for the candid and 
transparent discussion of risk without the 
presence of the executive team. This is 
particularly effective in mitigating the 
effect of dominant executive personalities, 
when a ‘command and control’ dictatorial 
approach to strategic risk in the 
boardroom may run contrary to the 
board’s effective performance of its 
assurance function.
Social obstruction 2: Board sensitivity 
to time pressure
‘I think time is a big factor; do they 
spend enough time specifically talking 
about risk [rather] than talking about 
strategy? I think that’s an issue’ 
(executive director).
Irrespective of the development of a safe 
zone, the nature of the risk data, or the 
complexity of the business, if a board does 
not have adequate resources and time to 
undertake risk-management activities it will 
struggle to carry out its role satisfactorily. 
Participants noted that, without the time 
to employ RI-SKeet effectively within the 
boardroom, the natural tendency would be 
to focus on the downside while supressing 
upside considerations. This places more 
emphasis on the importance of away-
days, for example, to allow the board to 
give undivided time and attention to 
focus on risk, as outlined in section 2.3.
Participants also noted that the time made 
available for effective risk-management 
discussions may not be adequate. One of 
the key reasons why this is so, is that it can 
be perceived as a bureaucratic hindrance, 
getting in the way of what are perceived to 
be more immediate board-level concerns. 
Among the participants’ firms, this was 
particularly common in environments that 
are dynamic and fast-paced, especially 
where boards are reacting to events rather 
than taking more proactive control. This 
bureaucratic hindrance perspective was 
explained as follows: ‘I think risk gets a 
bad press, a bad name, because it’s seen 
as a box ticking, very routine, that doesn’t 
add value’ (non-executive director).
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available for effective risk-
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may not be adequate.
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2.5 EXECUTIVE AND NON-EXECUTIVE 
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
The participants generally accepted the 
importance of risk management in board 
deliberations. This section considers 
divergence and convergence in the roles 
of executive and non-executive directors 
when managing risk at board level, as 
well as the role of other risk specialists in 
supporting them.
2.5.1 The role of the board
There is no distinction in law between the 
executive and non-executive directors on 
the board of a company (although there 
can be a distinction in not-for-profit and 
charity organisations). When describing 
the role of the board in relation to risk, 
unity of purpose was reflected by various 
participants, and centred on the issue of 
(risk) governance.
‘So absolutely, there’s a very important 
role for the board to play, but they are not 
the executive. They are the governance. 
And I do think sometimes people get a bit 
mixed up about what the role is. And the 
role is not to manage the company. The 
role is to govern the organisation…
‘If you have a crisis, it is not the role 
of the board to jump in and manage 
the crisis, that’s an executive role. The 
board’s role is to make sure that the 
business has a crisis team, that they’re 
properly resourced, properly rehearsed, 
and can give comfort to the board that if 
something goes wrong, they know that 
the organisation is prepared and will cope 
with it’ (non-executive director).
Nevertheless, some participants argued 
that executives are the risk owners, with 
the board setting the parameters and 
assessing the risk controls. On this role of 
the board, participants emphasised the 
importance of non-executives, and the 
following statement is typical: 
‘the big difference is that they… [are] 
able to take that more independent, 
strategic view as a non-executive, that’s 
harder to do as an executive. And I think 
the lines should be very clearly drawn 
between the two, because if it starts, 
that blurring of lines then that can be 
difficult for the executive. But also when 
non-executives do have to take that step 
back and exercise some independent 
judgement, that can be very hard, if [they 
are] too involved in the day-to-day or too 
close to the day-to-day management of 
the business’ (non-executive director).
The blurring of responsibilities may arise 
where non-executives have been brought 
onto the board specifically because of 
their expertise: 
‘what you find happening is that non-
executives are brought in because of a 
specific area of expertise and they spend 
their life second guessing the executives, 
which of course leads to enormous 
frustration’ (executive director).
Participants indicated that smaller, 
particularly owner/manager, organisations 
can experience particular problems in 
maintaining this divide:
‘one of the things that is really difficult…
is that there are no distinguishing elements 
between direction and management…
So that distinguishing between what is 
strategy and what is operational is quite 
blurred…and always the operational 
imperative will trump the strategic 
perspective’ (non-executive director). 
2.5.2 The ‘critical friend’
When discussing governance and the 
management of risk, some participants did 
so in the context of a board’s relationship 
to the managers in the business.
‘But I think the board can step aside 
and see the bigger picture and identify 
more global risks, maybe, that could 
have an impact on the business that the 
executives at the lower level [non-board 
senior management] wouldn’t be able to 
see’ (executive director).
Nonetheless, the majority of participants 
discussed this supportive and inquisitive 
relationship in the context of the 
relationship between executives and 
non-executives at board level. Thus 
participants variously referred to non-
executives bringing to the board: 
•  an external perspective (non-executive 
director) 
•  positive challenge and holding to 
account (non-executive director) 
• objectivity (executive director) 
•  an ‘additive’ input (non-executive 
director) 
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owners, with the board 
setting the parameters and 
assessing the risk controls.
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•  support and the right parameters 
(non-executive director) 
• oversight (executive director) 
• influence (non-executive director) 
• critical friend (non-executive director). 
The ‘critical friend’ concept captures both 
the support and the rigorous examination 
that participants expected NEDs to bring 
to an organisation and to the executive 
directors in their running of that 
organisation, to ensure the effectiveness 
of the board. 
2.5.3 Different perspectives and  
board dynamics
The participants drew attention to the 
different perspectives that executives and 
non-executives bring to the operation 
and decisions of the board.
 ‘… the execs bring experience, detail, 
track record, you name it from the business. 
The non-executives bring dispassion … 
without emotional investment … the 
execs bring depth, then the non-executives 
should bring breadth and bring … to bear 
their experience they had from other areas’ 
(non-executive director).
Participants went on to suggest that the 
NED’s job is to provide support through 
constructive input and suggestions for 
optimising risk-management decisions, 
while it is the executive’s job to think of the 
practical solutions for the implementation 
of these decisions. Participants were also 
clear about the effect that different 
personalities can have on board dynamics 
and resultant risk-management outcomes:
‘if you’ve got some people that are really 
passionate about it and have the trust of 
the board then [they] can revolutionise 
the way a board looks at risk. If you 
haven’t got somebody [who is] passionate 
and [who] doesn’t really get it, then it 
becomes fairly piecemeal and fairly, 
sort of, part of what happens’ (non-
executive director).
It was also noted that the stability of a 
particular business or industry can have 
an effect on the board’s approach to risk. 
A key concern expressed by some 
participants was that ‘cosy club’ type 
cultures can emerge in benign risk 
environments, leading to complacency 
and a lack of challenge in the board room. 
‘In some businesses, where things tend 
to be very, very stable, the non-execs 
tend to be a little club, they just come in 
and they meet, and they go through the 
motions, but because the environment is 
stable, then they tend to be fairly tame 
at meetings. We’ve got completely the 
opposite, where they come in, they aren’t 
aggressive, but very challenging, simply 
because they recognise transformation 
puts the business at enormous risk’ 
(executive director).
Overall, participants observed that 
managing the mix of characters, in what 
one participant referred to as the ‘theatre 
of the board’ (executive director) was 
regarded as key in enabling the 
discussion of risk at board level. The same 
participant also noted how this extended 
to the management of board meetings 
themselves, especially when agendas are 
large, limiting discussion and challenge 
(see also section 2.4). 
2.5.4 Risk discussion at board level – 
the critical space
A theme emphasised by a number of 
participants was the distinction between 
‘ensurance’ and assurance – where the 
role of the executive directors is to ensure 
that the organisation’s strategy is 
implemented, and NEDs assure that the 
implementation is performed effectively 
and is consistent with the agreed strategy.
‘We very often think about the role of 
the board being fundamentally about 
the assurance in terms of safety of the 
overall organisation – reputation, cost 
of return on capital, all of those issues; 
and the executive is responsible for the 
“ensurance” of the way in which assets 
are deployed in the organisation, and 
how you have as a board a sensible, 
meaningful conversation about that 
interrelationship seems to me to be 
absolutely critical – it’s a critical space …’ 
(executive director).
Participants were also clear 
about the effect that different 
personalities can have on 
board dynamics and resultant 
risk-management outcomes.
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A distinction was also made between 
executives and non-executives’ roles in 
the management of risk. Outside the 
board, executives were responsible for 
day-to-day risk taking across the 
organisation, while the board itself, and 
 in particular NEDs, kept a degree of 
separation from this activity: 
‘there’s a dichotomy that exists  
between the board table and the 
executives, because the executives 
actually are taking the risk [whereas] the 
board very rarely takes the risk; it’s the 
executives themselves who are taking 
that risk’ (non-executive director).
The reason for this separation was to 
allow the board to operate as a ‘critical 
space’ within which both executives and 
non-executives can debate and challenge 
at a strategic level. The ‘critical’ nature of 
the ‘critical space’ arises because the 
interactions between board members are 
crucial for effective risk governance. In 
turn, it is this space that encourages and 
nurtures a relationship where each 
non-executive can be both a ‘critical’  
and a ‘supportive’ friend. 
‘Their main role is to hold [me] and  
the group chief executive to account, 
and to make sure that we have got 
the processes and procedures in place 
to manage the risks that we…as the 
executive, …think we face. And to 
challenge us on our assessment of  
those risks’ (executive director).
Within this critical space, the importance 
of the safe-zone atmosphere discussed in 
section 2.4.2 becomes even more obvious. 
2.5.5 Committees and risk managers
The discussion by participants of the 
relationship between the board and audit 
committee, risk committee, or audit and 
risk committee, as well as risk managers, 
reflected the issues already mentioned 
above. Participants noted the difficulty of 
drilling down into detailed risk issues 
within time-pressured board meetings, 
and the important role of the audit and/
or risk committee:
‘the Board meeting was three hours 
… he [the risk manager] should really 
have had an hour out of that three hours, 
in my view, to really get to the bottom 
of some of these [risk] areas, [but] he 
was granted 10 minutes or so...So that 
bit there said, okay, so things aren’t 
happening correctly at [the] board, where 
should they then happen? So the audit 
committee, in my view, is the place where 
scrutiny of the [risk] areas takes place’ 
(non-executive director). 
The risk and/or audit committee was  
seen to act as a filter for the board, with  
a more succinct discussion taking place  
at board level. 
‘It’s a very fine filter, if you like, in that 
the discussions that take place in the 
committees, it’s really down to the chair 
of that committee then to distil the key 
points from the committee discussion to 
the board’ (executive director).
Nonetheless, participants noted the 
possibility of duplication, especially if 
there is both a risk committee and an audit 
committee and reporting lines are not 
clear. Outside formal reporting, established 
lines of communication between executive 
and non-executive board members, as 
well as between board members and 
sub-committees, were therefore regarded 
as important in enhancing the risk 
discussion at board level. Key one-to-one 
relationships that were identified included 
the board chair and CEO and the audit 
committee chair and CFO. 
Participants also mentioned the importance 
of the board’s, especially non-executives’, 
relationship with senior risk managers in the 
organisation. These relationships helped 
ensure that discussions at board level 
were supported with all necessary data, as 
well as allowing NEDs to metaphorically 
‘kick the tyres’ (executive director) of the 
organisation in relation to its risk policies.
The risk and/or audit 
committee was seen to act 
as a filter for the board, with 
a more succinct discussion 
taking place at board level. 
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This section provides some suggestions that boards and policymakers 
may wish to consider so as to improve their practice. All the 
suggestions have come from the participants and reflect practices  
that they have put into place and which have been proved to work.
3. Suggestions 
for practice
3.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR BOARDS
3.1.1 Integrating risk and strategy
1.  Place risk in a positive context. Consider the potential for 
outcomes to be better, as well as worse, than expected, 
making it clear when you are talking about opportunities 
and risks. If necessary, avoid using words such as risk if they 
have a negative meaning in your organisation; eg consider 
alternatives such as ‘volatility’ and ‘uncertainty’.
2.  Integrate your strategy and risk decisions. When setting your 
strategy and business objectives, consider the potential for 
better or worse-than-expected outcomes from the outset.
3.  Boards should adopt the 75:25 rule. Spend 75% of board 
meetings looking outwards and forwards. This will help the 
board to identify external and future threats and 
opportunities. Spend the remaining 25% of board meetings 
looking inwards and backwards. This will help the board to 
understand the organisation’s capabilities and competencies 
in areas such as finance and risk management. 
4.  It may be instructive for boards to reflect on the relationship 
between risk appetite and strategy when reaching decisions 
about both. Section 2.2 indicated that it is often unclear 
whether risk appetite should come before or after strategy 
(a ‘chicken and egg’ situation). Consider whether the board’s 
risk appetite determines strategy, or whether decisions about 
strategy lead to how the organisation frames its risk appetite. 
3.1.2 Deriving value from risk management
1.  Compliance and a ‘tick box’ approach may be the correct 
approach to take to certain elements of risk governance. 
Nonetheless, boards should be aware of the limitations that 
a ‘compliance mind-set’ may place upon their ability to 
exploit opportunities by taking risks. 
2.  Boards should be mindful of the interrelationship between 
the embeddedness of risk in the discussions and decisions 
of the board, and its embeddedness in the organisation 
itself. This emphasises the importance of the ‘tone at the 
top’ set by the board and of efforts of board members to 
‘test the temperature’ of what is happening in practice in 
the organisation. 
3.  Boards should recognise that, in managing significant risk 
events, it is possible to enhance, not just preserve, the value 
of the organisation, for example in managing reputational 
risk. Significant events, mishaps and failures can also be 
used as prompts for testing the risk appetite, and the 
resilience of the risk framework and governance structures, 
of an organisation.
4.  Boards are being held more accountable by a wider range 
of stakeholders than in the recent past. Being clear and 
transparent about how the board manages risk, and 
communicating this externally, is important for every 
organisation, including those in less-regulated sectors.
3.1.3 Delivering RI-SKEET
1.  Identify gaps in RI-SKeet by employing board reviews that 
align strategic risks with the output of those reviews, and 
where necessary include annual training that ensures that 
members of the board remain risk-relevant with bespoke 
training for each of the members of the board. 
2.  ‘Kick the tyres’. All NEDs should get out into the business to 
understand it. Think about spending time in social 
environments within the business – the tea room, the 
canteen – where much more can be picked up qualitatively 
than is presented to boards in their meeting packs. 
3.  Use awaydays in order to improve RI-Skeet. They should be 
an impetus within the boardroom for the development and 
improvement of understanding of organisational risk 
exposure. The use of scenarios that are facilitated 
independently from the board, and executed with the 
business strategy and current strategic exposures in mind, 
will focus attention on exposures much more than a 
monthly RAG (Red, Amber, and Green) traffic-light rating.
4.  The owner-manager, as the ‘Swiss army knife of risk’ within 
their SME business, should identify the ‘killer issues’ to their 
business and ensure that they actively acquire appropriate 
RI-SKeet to address these issues. This may include using 
external risk specialists to support them.
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3.1.4 Managing and enhancing board 
risk discussions
1.  NEDs should consider the adoption of 
an ‘in camera’ session before and/or 
after board meetings. These sessions 
allow NEDs to meet without the 
presence and influence of the 
executive team to create a safe zone 
for the candid discussion of risk. This 
can be enhanced further by allowing 
NEDs to meet with representatives of 
the risk and independent oversight 
functions during ‘in camera’ sessions, 
to ensure that the tone at the top 
reflects the tune on the shop floor.
2.  All papers going to the board should 
have a dedicated risk section within 
the executive summary, highlighting 
their risk implications for the strategic 
objectives of the business. This provides 
visible anchor points for discussion of 
the strategic risk-reward equation.
3.  In the process of horizon scanning, the 
board should consider requesting a 
‘deep dive’ analysis of a number of the 
key strategic risks for scrutiny during 
away days with a dedicated risk focus. 
This will reduce the information 
burden on the board while ensuring 
that the reporting of information is 
tailored to the needs of the decision 
makers. ‘Deep-dive’ analysis can also 
be performed through audit and/or 
risk committees.
3.1.5 Executive and non-executive 
dynamics
1.  Create a critical space for risk debate 
by encouraging constructive 
challenge. Boards should be aware of 
the possibility of apparently benign 
risk environments leading to 
complacency in the boardroom. 
2.  Unified responsibility does not 
necessarily mean unified roles at board 
level. NEDs should maintain a degree 
of separation from day-to-day risk 
taking activities, enabling them to carry 
out their role as ‘critical friends’ to the 
executive and senior management.
3.  Boards should ensure they structure, 
and make use of, their committees (eg 
risk, audit) in a way that best supports 
the board’s decision making on 
strategic risks while not delegating 
their accountability. Established lines 
of communication between the board, 
its committees, and the risk specialists 
supporting those committees, should 
be clear and transparent.
3.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
The participants showed that policymakers 
can have a significant influence on 
board-level risk-management 
conversations and practices. Often this 
influence is positive, but care is needed to 
move board activities in the right direction. 
1.  Policymakers should revisit their risk 
mind-set: risk is not bad in itself and 
opportunities are never certain. Rather 
than considering risk management as a 
device for increasing certainty, it 
should be considered as a means for 
achieving ever more positive 
outcomes. Risk management should 
help an organisation to create value, as 
well as to protect it.
2.  Always encourage boards to make links 
between strategy and risk. Potential 
risk exposures, along with the ability of 
an organisation to manage these 
exposures, should be considered as part 
of strategy setting. Risk management 
should not be a bolt-on activity after 
the strategy has been determined.
3.  Recognise the difference between 
separation and segregation. Boards, 
and especially non-executives, need to 
maintain a degree of independence, 
but that does not mean they should be 
kept apart from the people within the 
organisation. Boards should understand 
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and steer the culture of an organisation 
so that it promotes an appropriate 
balance between risk and control.
4.  Culture, including risk culture, is still an 
ambiguous concept for many. 
Policymakers may wish to facilitate 
best practice sharing as well as provide 
more guidance on what culture means 
in the context of risk management and 
how boards may lead in setting the 
right risk culture. 
5.  Policymakers should be mindful of the 
effect (and potential benefits) that the 
work they do in more regulated sectors 
can have on (and for) the behaviour of 
boards in less regulated sectors.
6.  Use failures as feedback. Help 
organisations to learn the lessons from 
past failures. Use this information as 
feedback to assist organisations in 
improving their approach to 
understanding and dealing with risk.
Questions for reflection
Organisations and their boards may wish to reflect on the following questions, 
which may help benchmark their board-level risk-management activities.
1.  How often does your board review and enhance its risk-management activities?
2.  Does your board consider, from the outset, the risk implications of different 
strategic options, ie as a key component of strategy creation? How are these 
options and their associated risks presented to the board?
3.  Where is your board on the principled–prescriptive spectrum? What are the 
strengths and weaknesses associated with your board’s position and do you 
need to consider becoming either more principled or more prescriptive?
4.  How do you review the diversity of risk intelligence, skills, knowledge, 
experience, education and training (RI-SKeet) across the board? How do you 
address any gaps in RI-SKeet?
5.  How often do you consider the composition of the board, and its RI-Skeet? 
Do you review composition and RI-SKeet when changes, or proposed 
changes, to the strategic direction of the organisation are being considered? 
6.  Do you create a safe-zone atmosphere for the discussion of risk-management 
issues? Are board members encouraged to challenge the status quo?
7.  Are board members, and NEDs in particular, encouraged to get out into the 
organisation and to understand its people and culture?
8.  Do NEDs act as critical friends to the executive and wider senior management 
team – helping them to exploit opportunities and avoid losses?
9.  How much time do you devote to risk management at board meetings?  
Are opportunities to discuss risk management provided outside formal  
board meetings?  
10.  How effective are the board’s subcommittees in enabling the board to focus 
on strategic risk-management issues?
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‘Boards are responsible for setting 
strategy and fundamental to that is this 
understanding of risk versus reward. 
So, if we sit in this direction, what are 
the potential risks? What’s the reward? 
Obviously in formulating that kind of 
cohesive strategy you need to have a 
really good grasp of that. So, to me it’s 
kind of fundamental to the core function 
of a board for it to have… a good 
appreciation and understanding of risk 
management. That’s kind of response 
number one’ (executive director). 
The effective governance of organisations 
requires boards to fulfil a wide range of 
responsibilities and it is often hard to 
balance these during time-limited board 
meetings. One solution is to recognise 
the fact that many of these 
responsibilities are connected, especially 
those related to strategy and risk, as 
indicated by the above participant.
The research shows that while many 
boards are taking steps to connect their 
strategic and risk-management 
responsibilities, there does not appear to 
be one best way to achieve this. Rather, a 
diversity of practices exists, each with 
different strengths and weaknesses. It is 
possible, however, to situate these 
practices, to a degree, via what is termed 
above the ‘principled–prescriptive 
spectrum’ (see section 2.1.2 above) 
•  Organisations and boards that adopt a 
more principled approach are likely to 
make more connections between 
strategy and risk, but these connections 
may not be very explicit and are often 
unstructured. Failure to make such 
connections can lead to inconsistent 
decision making and the pursuit of 
opportunities without the proper 
consideration of downside outcomes.
•  Organisations and boards that adopt a 
more prescriptive approach tend to 
view risk management as a device for 
internal control and, to the extent that 
connections are made between 
strategy and risk, their focus is on risks 
to objectives. This can make it harder 
to exploit opportunities, but risk-
management activity is more 
structured, meaning that ‘downside’ 
outcomes may be better controlled.
Whichever approach is adopted between 
the two extremes, effective strategic-level 
leadership is not necessarily about 
achieving greater levels of certainty; it is 
about being able to exploit any 
uncertainty that may exist to the 
advantage of the organisation and its 
stakeholders. Risk-management tools 
such as risk reports, risk appetite 
statements and managing the cultural 
aspects of risk taking can be used to help 
support this, as much as they can be used 
to mitigate losses.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this research also 
shows that the primary driver for much 
board-level risk-management activity is 
compliance. Legislation, regulatory 
requirements, corporate codes and 
professional codes of conduct were 
regarded by many participants as having 
a direct effect on attitudes and practices 
in relation to risk management. This may 
be a doubled-edged sword; on the one 
hand ensuring that boards are engaged 
in risk management, but on the other 
promoting a tick-box approach. What 
may help here is a greater emphasis on 
the other benefits of risk management, 
for example in mitigating reputational 
effects, improving efficiency or the 
exploitation of opportunities. 
As regards the mix and composition of 
board skills, having board members who 
are risk-management professionals can 
be helpful, as are internal and external 
4. Conclusion
Risk and the strategic role of leadership     |     4. Conclusion
30
risk management specialists who support 
boards. Nonetheless, it would seem that 
even more important is fostering a 
diverse range of risk intelligence, skills, 
knowledge, experience, education and 
training (RI-SKeet) across the board. 
Boards operate as a collective intelligence: 
no one board member can possibly know 
everything there is to know about risk 
management or the various risks and 
opportunities that may affect the strategy 
and governance of an organisation. The 
more diverse the types of RI-SKeet among 
the board members, the better prepared 
organisations will be both to avoid and 
mitigate the downside of risk events and 
to exploit potential opportunities.
It is therefore important to ensure that a 
board maximises its RI-SKeet potential. 
Backward looking, static and/or lengthy 
risk reports do not help here, but equally 
significant is the creation of a safe-zone 
atmosphere where boards are free to 
discuss risk issues in an open and 
constructive way. This may include 
encouraging board members to ask ‘dumb’ 
questions, challenging the status quo by 
playing devil’s advocate or considering 
extreme risk events or control failures. 
Finding ways to explore risk-management 
issues outside time-pressured board 
meetings can also be important, for 
example by organising board away days.
Finally, it was plain that, while boards may 
have shared responsibilities, this does not 
mean that board members all share the 
same roles. Participants explained that 
the role of the executive is to ensure that 
the organisation’s strategy is 
implemented and that the board, and 
NEDs in particular, assure that the 
implementation is effective and 
consistent with the agreed strategy. In 
this context, the board provides a critical 
space for discussions about strategy and 
risk, with the NEDs acting as critical 
friends to the executive and wider senior 
management team. In performing this 
critical friend role, NEDs are able to step 
back and see a bigger picture. As a result, 
they are better able to use their RI-SKeet 
to ‘horizon scan’ for emerging 
opportunities or losses and so guide 
executives/management in the most 
appropriate way. They may also help to 
constrain both over-exuberant and 
too-timid risk taking.
Are boards ready for the challenges of 
today, as the strategic environment 
becomes ever more complex and 
interconnected and regulation only ever 
seems to increase? Can they exploit the 
opportunities that come with change, 
while at the same time mitigating any 
associated potential loss events? From 
this research it is clear that there is 
already much good risk-management 
practice, but this practice needs to be 
shared more widely and in an open-
minded way. It is for organisations to 
select the practices that best suit their 
needs. It is hoped that this report will 
help boards to learn from the experiences 
of a wide range of organisations to 
enable them to continue to future-proof 
their activities. 
From this research it is clear 
that there is already much 
good risk-management 
practice, but this practice needs 
to be shared more widely and 
in an open-minded way.
31
The findings from this report were drawn from 30 semi-structured interviews conducted 
with non-executive and executive board members from a wide range of organisations.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the  
14 executive and 14 non-executive 
participants in this project, plus two 
board-level consultants. Participants 
came from both large quoted (eg FTSE 
100 and 250) companies and SMEs and 
included people from both for-profit and 
not-for-profit organisations, including 
charities and social enterprises. A 
significant number of the participants, 
especially the non-executives, had 
current experience of multiple 
organisations, so in fact information on 
experience of board-level risk-
management activities in approximately 
60 different organisations was collected. 
All interviews were conducted on the 
phone via conference call facilities and 
were recorded, allowing for each 
interview to be transcribed for 
subsequent analysis. In most cases 
interviews were conducted by two, 
occasionally three, of the researchers to 
help control for interviewer bias and to 
ensure that each interview was as 
complete as possible.
To improve robustness further, the draft 
findings from the interviews were 
presented to two focus groups in 
November and December 2017. These 
focus groups consisted of risk-
management experts and industry 
association representatives.
Data limitations, especially for private 
companies, make the precise calculation 
of the split between SME and larger 
organisations complex. A search based 
on publicly available information 
indicated that the participants have 
been involved in, approximately, a total 
of 7 FTSE 100 and 10 other quoted (eg 
FSE 250, 350 and AIM) companies.  
In addition a total of 17 private, 8 
partnership and 15 not-for-profit entities 
were represented. The remainder were 
a variety of other organisational forms 
(eg networks, members’ associations 
and employee-owned firms).
To manage the effects of cross-cultural 
biases and different regimes for 
corporate governance and risk-
management regulation, the research 
focused on UK-based organisations 
(though a number were multinational in 
focus). The researchers would 
encourage organisations, boards and 
researchers in other countries to build 
on this research and explore the 
risk-management activities of boards 
based in their countries. The expansion 
of this research would create further 
opportunities for sharing good practice. 
TABLE 2.1: Overview of participants
ROLE NUMBER SECTORS LARGE/SME SPLIT 
(Approximate)
CEO 5 Banking; Consulting; Housing; 
Investment; Trade Association
40%/60%
Other executive 9 Consulting; Financial services; 
Hotel; IT; Manufacturing; Property; 
Public services; Retail
70%/30%
Non-Executive 
(including one or 
more appointments 
as board chair)
7 Aerospace; Charity and voluntary; 
Commercial property; 
Government advisory; Hospital; 
Investment; IT; Housing; 
Insurance; Legal services; 
Manufacturing; Pensions; 
Religious; Retail; Social Enterprise; 
Telecommunication; Transport
60%/40%
Other non-
executive (including 
one trustee)
7
Board consultants  
and NEDs
2 Board advisory services; 
Education; Insurance
0%/100%
Project 
methodology
n CEO
n Other executive
n Non-Executive 
n Other non-executive
n  Board consultants 
and NEDs
30%
23%
23%
7%
17%
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